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We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we can live - by the postulating of 
bodies, lines, surfaces, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content: without 
these articles of faith no one could manage to live at present! But for all that they are 
still unproved. Life is no argument; error might be among the conditions of life 
(italics added) (Nietzsche 1882/1974; aphorism #121, Book III). 
 
We thought it appropriate for a philosophical reflection on the concept of 
rationality and irrationality to start out with this excerpt from Nietzsche’s 
The Gay Science (1882). The idea that error may be an intrinsic part of 
life—surely a Baconian echo—appears particularly useful to zoom in on 
all the difficulties that arise whenever we focus on the boundaries 
surrounding rationality. In our everyday experience of the world, as well 
as of ourselves and our minds, our capacity for rational judgment proves 
staggeringly unsuccessful in carving out a stable dominion for itself. We 
delude ourselves to be rational even when we employ apparently solid a 
posteriori arguments. Confabulation is part and parcel of our mental life: 
it comes in the form of the explanations that we provide to ourselves and 
others for actions or thoughts that we are unable to authentically 
understand (Hirstein 2009).  
 
Why are human behavior and thoughts so mysterious? How far does the 
domain of reason—to say it in a Kantian fashion—stretch? To answer 
these questions we should first admit that our rational capacities, along 
with their corresponding neural systems, are far from being encapsulated 
and entrenched. Rather, as Pessoa convincingly argues (2013, 2018), 
emotional processing appears to be deeply integrated with perception, 
cognition, motivation, and action. This implies that abilities that have 
traditionally been characterized as rational—such as evidence gathering 
and executive functioning—result from the cooperation of cognitive and 
affective components at different levels.  
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Pessoa’s work does justice to an intuition that many philosophers and 
psychiatrists have thoroughly explored over the years. Jervis, for instance, 
discusses the mysterious and yet inescapable influence of “emotional 
impulses in the formation of judgments and the production of apparently 
neutral and objective statements” (Jervis 1989, 17). Freud, in his early 
studies on hysteria (1895), was similarly interested in the notion of ideas 
being colored by affect and expressed this point in quantitative terms by 
talking about “quotas of affect” variously attaching themselves to thoughts. 
As will become clearer in this special issue, these questions surrounding 
rationality and its boundaries have deep philosophical and clinical 




The Bounds of Rationality 
 
Any reasonable person, and therefore, I hope, any rationalist, knows quite 
well that reason plays a very modest role in human life. (Karl Popper, 
1984) 
 
This special issue focuses on the controversial boundary between 
rationality and irrationality and on its multiple connections with 
psychopathology. Exploring such a boundary along with its complexities 
has become increasingly common over the past few decades. Indeed, the 
topic has garnered significant attention both in psychology and in 
philosophy of psychiatry, with a number of researchers exploring the idea 
that rational and irrational states may be seen as importantly continuous.  
 
On the one hand, the empirical work conducted by Gigerenzer & Selten 
(2002) and Kahneman & Tversky (1992)—among many others—has 
convincingly established the bounded nature of our rational capacities. Far 
from being exact, dispassionate, and impartial, our way of knowing the 
world and ourselves turns out to be rife with biases, imperfections, and 
blind spots. On the other hand, the theoretical work developed by 
Bortolotti and colleagues (see, e.g. Bortolotti 2010) on irrational beliefs, 
delusions, and illusions has brought to the fore some unexpected benefits 
of these states, as well as their close proximity with ordinary cognition. 
Looking at these two research strands, one may get the impression that the 
boundary between rational and irrational is growing thinner by the day. 
What was once squarely categorized in the realm of rationality—e.g. 
beliefs, decision-making—now appears to be tainted with irrational 
features. By contrast, what was taken to be paradigmatically irrational—
such as delusions—is now seen as exhibiting some epistemic and 
psychological benefits (Bortolotti 2020). Where does this leave us?  
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The fact that researchers in psychology and philosophy have rightfully 
uncovered such a strong continuity between rationality and irrationality 
should not make us overlook the importance that the distinction bears on 
practical and clinical matters. This divergent perspective stems from 
substantial differences among disciplines. Psychiatry, as a branch of 
medicine, aims at understanding pathological states in order to devise more 
effective forms of treatment and intervention. Its goals are inherently 
pragmatic and its focus lies on the analysis and management of individual 
symptoms of suffering (along with their social consequences). It is 
therefore unsurprising that within psychiatry mental disorders in general, 
and delusions in particular, are still often characterized in terms of 
breakdowns of reason (epistemic irrationality) or as failures to act 
according to rational norms (practical or agential irrationality). The 
diagnostic manuals issued by the American Psychiatric Association 
provide a paradigmatic example of this tendency. In the DSM-IV-TR 
(APA 2000) delusions were still characterized in terms of their falsehood 
(i.e. as “false beliefs”), whereas in the most recent version (DSM 5; APA 
2013) the falsehood requirement has been dropped in favor of a 
characterization that emphasizes epistemic irrationality (i.e. “fixed beliefs 
that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence”). 
Although these characterizations undoubtedly map onto canonical 
definitions of beliefs and rationality, they seem to overlook the complexity 
surrounding the empirical and philosophical challenges mentioned above.  
 
This tension between different fields of inquiry shows that the nature of 
the rational-irrational boundary would greatly benefit from further 
investigation, especially considering its clinical ramifications. Our hope is 
that philosophical reflections may clear up some terminological and 
conceptual misunderstandings. In this respect, one source of confusion 
stems from characterizing delusions solely in terms of reasoning mistakes. 
Although there is convincing evidence about some distortions of reasoning 
being more prominent in delusional populations (see, for instance, Dudley 
et al. 2015 on the “jumping to conclusions” bias), such distortions fail to 
fully account for the complex nature of delusion. As Jaspers already noted 
(1913), clinically relevant delusions go well beyond distorted, mistaken, or 
unduly stubborn judgments. If we labeled all our incorrigible judgments as 
delusions, it would follow that we could not harbor firm or even 
unshakable beliefs without qualifying them as delusional. However, 
drawing the line between irrational and delusional beliefs has proved more 
difficult than expected. As we mention above, the work conducted by 
Bortolotti and colleagues shows that several non-delusional beliefs that we 
routinely entertain are inadequately supported by evidence, or fail to 
follow epistemic norms of rationality.  
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These considerations raise two further points: delusions appear to be fully 
integrated in a continuum of experience; and delusional manifestations are 
the outcome of a subjective inner journey (Rossi Monti 2008). Focusing 
on the latter, we cannot fail to notice the strong emotional and motivational 
component that lies at the roots of delusional onset and maintenance. As 
the psychoanalytic tradition has already proposed, delusions may represent 
a powerful defense mechanism that succeeds in alienating an individual 
from reality (Freud 1949; Nacht and Racamier 1958). From a 
psychodynamic perspective, delusions thus represent an attempt to solve 
internal conflicts, or to (provisionally) liberate oneself from traumas and 
unconscious fears. More precisely, they may be seen as the result of a 
compromise that emerges from a series of conflicts between the ego and 
the outside world (Bollea and Mayer 1968, 25). In this sense, the recent 
work on epistemic and non-epistemic benefits of delusional beliefs 
(Bortolotti 2015, 2020) may be seen as a promising uptake of this classic 
motivational idea.  
 
To sum up, according to the phenomenological tradition initiated by 
Jaspers (1913), delusions should be seen as the expression of a subjective 
projection that directly indicates a distorted relationship between an 
individual and the world. From this perspective, delusions qualify as a 
pathological form of being in the world. Therefore, the content of the 
delusional belief—even more than its form—acquires great importance in 
a clinical setting as it may provide clinicians with valuable information 
about the patient’s relationship with the world, along with her thoughts and 
affects. According to the psychoanalytic tradition, the individual’s beliefs 
about the world and others are distorted for defensive purposes. These two 
interpretations do not constitute mutually exclusive models. On the 
contrary, we believe that both perspectives may complement each other as 
well as fruitfully inform doxastic theories, which are currently more 
focused on the cognitive level. Such a pluralistic framework would have 
the advantage of providing a finer-grained picture of the nature of 
delusions, one that would do justice to such a complex range of 
phenomena.   
 
The recovery of phenomenological and psychoanalytic aspects would 
enrich the philosophical research on pathological and non-pathological 
beliefs “for at least four practical reasons”, as suggested by Green and 
colleagues (2018, 2): 
 
First, how we characterize delusions will impact how we treat 
them. Cognitive behavioral therapies focus explicitly on 
engaging with and restructuring beliefs […], but if delusions 
are not (or not always) belief states, it may be important to 
Introduction to the Special Issue “Bounds of Rationality” 
 9 
develop other therapeutic approaches. Second, the cognitive 
nature of delusions is important for a full understanding of the 
ethical and legal status of people who hold them and who act 
on them. Third, the status of delusions has implications for how 
we understand the experiences of those who hold them […]. 
Fourth, understanding the nature and phenomenology of 
delusions has a bearing on how to assess them. This is 
particularly important when considering whether patients are 
attempting to malinger delusions. (Ibid.) 
 
 
Summary of each contribution 
 
The special issue opens with an article by Valentina Cardella who 
immediately gets to the heart of the matter by investigating schizophrenia 
and delusions in their complex relationship with the notion of rationality. 
She does so by reviewing some interesting evidence suggesting that 
“psychopathological patients can be, in some circumstances, more logical 
than normal controls” (p. 13). This further contributes to dismantle the 
commonsense view of delusional subjects as irrational people who lack 
autonomy, rationality, responsibility, or who are unable to sufficiently 
control their own emotions and behaviors. Cardella convincingly overturns 
this view by showing that, as long as we equate logical abilities with 
broadly rational ones, there seem to be no robust reasoning deficits in 
schizophrenia, with the exception of cases linked to a more general 
cognitive deterioration. Her article thus contributes to shed light on a 
seriously overlooked fact, namely that—at least in some cases—
schizophrenic people seem to be more rational than non-schizophrenic 
ones.   
 
Taking a deeper look at the mechanisms underlying delusion formation, 
Lancellotta and Bortolotti focus on two-factor theories (Coltheart et al. 
2010; McKay 2012) to assess whether these views are compatible with the 
pathological and adaptive character of delusions. After discussing 
naturalist and normativist accounts, they argue that both views encounter 
difficulties in assessing the pathological nature of delusions. On the 
normativist reading, delusions would need to be harmful to count as 
pathological; however, it is not fully clear that delusions are always the 
source of harm as opposed to a response to an existing crisis that causes 
harm. On the naturalist reading, delusions count as pathological because 
they are seen as the outcome of a dysfunctional process. However, it is far 
from clear that the cognitive process underlying delusion formation is 
dysfunctional as opposed to simply operating in non-ideal conditions. 
Bortolotti and Lancellotta go on to show that the two accounts under 
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examination importantly differ in their assessment of the adaptive potential 
of delusions. While McKay’s model grants that some delusional beliefs 
may be adaptive in the short-term, Coltheart’s model rules out this 
possibility entirely.  
 
Sam Wilkinson’s paper tackles the complexity of delusions from a 
different angle. By focusing on delusion attribution, i.e. on what happens 
when we say that someone is delusional, he puts forward an expressivist 
view based on positions defended in the field of meta-ethics. Wilkinson 
aims to move beyond the philosophical discussions on how to best 
characterize delusions, be it through strict definitions, working hypotheses, 
or canonical examples. Instead of focusing on delusional phenomena 
themselves, he raises fundamental questions about the way in which these 
phenomena are picked out. This different perspective allows him to cast 
doubts on the expectation—quite widespread in the literature—that 
delusion could be clearly defined. Such an expectation may turn out to be 
mistaken: when we say that someone is delusional, we are not in the 
business of describing reality but rather of expressing an attitude towards 
a state or condition that we wish to “flag as suspect” according to a 
plurality of norms and paradigms (many of which are social, rather than 
epistemic, in nature).  
 
Valentina Petrolini’s contribution zooms in on disorders of agency and sets 
out to offer a unifying account of these phenomena, including auditory 
verbal hallucinations (AVH), thought insertion, and pathological guilt. She 
characterizes disorders of agency as situations in which individuals have 
difficulties in assessing their own degree of responsibility or involvement 
with respect to a relevant action or event. Her main goal is to show that we 
may better understand these conditions by characterizing them as 
dimensional. Four case studies are discussed to corroborate this point: first, 
she characterizes AVH and pathological guilt as extreme cases of hypo- 
and hyper- agency, respectively. Then, she explores mind wandering and 
false confessions to show that these phenomena, despite their similarity to 
pathological ones, may be successfully distinguished from them. Seeing 
agency on a spectrum allows her to discuss these intermediate cases in a 
finer-grained manner: although some intermediate cases still turn out to be 
problematic (e.g. false confessions), others exhibit an adaptive nature in 
many circumstances (e.g. mind wandering).  
 
We felt it was important to close the special issue with a section devoted 
to historically informed reflections on the boundaries surrounding 
rationality. Matteo Fiorani’s contribution thoroughly investigates how 
rationality and irrationality were characterized and discussed throughout 
the history of psychiatry, focusing on the years spanning the second half 
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of the 1970s. Specifically, his article tackles the intricate debates that took 
place within the so-called anti-institutional psychiatry movement and how 
these were received and developed within the Italian New Left. Starting in 
1968, social and political movements in Europe and the United States 
raised radical concerns about the traditional idea of normality and its 
consequences in terms of laws and institutions. In this scenario, psychiatry 
and the anti-psychiatry movement became “an ideological battleground 
centered on the boundaries between normality and madness”, and, Fiorani 
explains, “the very ideal of reason was questioned”. 
 
Emiliano Loria’s paper concludes the special issue with some important 
epistemological reflections on the history of psychiatry. His contribution 
focuses on the discovery of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) by Ugo 
Cerletti in 1938 and its development throughout the twentieth century. 
Cerletti's historian and biographer Passione (2007, III) stresses the fact that 
ECT was seen by its inventor as a research tool as opposed to a 
revolutionary means of treatment. The idea that seizures may improve the 
catatonic and hallucinatory state of schizophrenic patients had been 
already applied by Ladislas von Meduna a few years earlier (exactly from 
1936). However, the use of camphor and cardiazol to induce seizures had 
proved distressing for patients and at times clinically ineffective. The use 
of electricity introduced by Cerletti was less invasive, cheaper, more 
tolerated by patients, and most importantly allowed clinicians to exercise 
a greater degree of control on convulsions and seizures. This last aspect 
greatly benefited the diffusion of ECT all over the world in record time. In 
the process of writing this article, Loria had the opportunity to visit the 
archives of the Roman Clinic of Nervous and Mental Diseases where 
Cerletti and his team worked. This allowed him to follow the interesting 
trajectory of development and application of ECT to schizophrenic 
patients, initially adults and later also children and adolescents. Such a 
review of past and present use of ECT is also meant to stimulate an ethical 
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